A model of airport slot allocation with posted prices by Nicolas Gruyer & Kevin Guittet
A model of airport slot allocation with posted prices∗
Nicolas Gruyer† K´ evin Guittet‡
August 6, 2008
Abstract
In this paper, we study the impact of the introduction of posted prices in the slot
allocation process currently in use at congested airports in most European countries. In
particular, we show that if the airport is initially saturated, while low level of slot prices
entail no response from the airlines, requests for slots ”suddenly and violently” drop when
the price reaches a certain threshold. In general, there is therefore no market clearing
price for airport slots. We also present a dynamic model which highlights how the current
grandfather rule - stating that slots used today are kept in the future - generates baby-
sitting, that is airlines requiring and using slots today just because they expect them to
be proﬁtable in the future.
JEL Codes : D21 L10 L93
Keywords: Capacity-constrained competition, airport slots.
∗An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 33rd conference of the European Association for
Research in Industrial Economics, Amsterdam, 25 - 27 August 2006 and at the 10th Conference of the Air
Transport Research Society, Nagoya, 25.-28. June 2006. We would like to thank the participants for their
helpful questions and comments.
†ENAC-LEEA. Email gruyer@recherche.enac.fr. Tel +33 5 62 17 40 29. Fax +33 5 62 17 40 17.
‡Corresponding author. DSNA/DTI/R&D. 7, avenue Edouard Belin, BP 54005, Toulouse Cedex 4, France.
Email guittet@tls.cena.fr. Tel +33 5 62 17 41 83. Fax +33 5 62 25 95 99.
11 Introduction
The slot allocation process currently in use in a number of congested airports worldwide1 is
often pointed out as a major source of ineﬃciency in the air transport industry. This process
heavily relies on the use of grandfather rights, according to which airlines may keep their
slots from one aeronautical season to another provided they have used them at least 80% of
the time. Slots that are free of grandfather rights (the slot pool) may be claimed by airlines
and their allocation is decided by a coordinator using a purely administrative procedure. A
ﬁnal stage in which slots may be exchanged one for one on a strictly non-monetary basis
is provided to ensure that airlines are able to complete their schedule. Ineﬃciency in the
current system are outlined, among others, in NERA (2004). Part of it stems from the fact
that historic rights inherited from the grandfather rule act as a barrier to entry on the airport.
Also, airlines do not pay the opportunity cost of ”owning” their slots and have therefore little
(if any) incentive to release excess capacity2. Finally, available slots (from the slot pool) are
not necessarily allocated to the airlines that would make the most eﬃcient use of them.
For these reasons, alternative modes for dealing with airport capacity have been sug-
gested, studied and, more rarely, implemented. Congestion charging, for example, suggests
that eﬃciency could be restaured by setting the cost of using airport capacity equal to the
marginal social cost of using the service (see e.g. Carlin and Park (1970)). However, theoret-
ical diﬃculties arise in the air transport industry, since airlines that have signiﬁcant market
power internalize part of the externality they impose on the system (see for instance Brueck-
ner (2002a), Brueckner (2002b)). More concretely, airport congestion pricing has, up to now,
failed to be eﬃciently implemented Schank (2005). Another approach proposes to use market
based mechanisms to allocate slots. This idea heads back to the early eighties (Rassenti et al.
(1982)) but is now gaining credit, with recent studies commisioned by the DGTREN (NERA
(2004)) or the Department for Transport in UK (DotEcon (2006)). Among the mechanisms
studied in NERA (2004) lies the introduction of ”posted prices” and the use of slot auctions,
along with the creation of a secondary market for slots. Interestingly enough, while some
recent economic results (Eso et al. (2006), Ranger (2006)) may help us to understand how
1”EU Slot regulation applies at 60% of all capacity constraint airports worldwide” (2004, source IATA).
2NERA (2004) puts forward that in D¨ usseldorf and Paris-Orly, 2 airports that are congested throughout
the day, under-utilization of capacity was larger than 10% in 2002. Hence, this ineﬃciency may be substantive
even at very congested airports.
2downstream competition is likely to impact outcomes in a capacity auction, only little as
been done that can be used to acknowledge its eﬀect if posted prices are introduced un-
der the current allocation procedure. In the case of auctions, Eso et al. (2006) shows that
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (that lead to an eﬃcient allocation when one only takes
the seller and the buyers’ surplus into account) may lead to a very ineﬃcient allocation of
capacity where a ﬁrm buys a large share of the sold capacity before using it ineﬃciently on the
market. In Ranger (2006), a sophisticated mechanism inspired from Ausubel and Milgrom
(2002) is proposed that corrects for the externality created by the downstream competition
and allows to implement general preferences of the seller. Hence, it seems that auctions could
at least theoretically be used to solve eﬃciently the problem of slot allocation at congested
airports. NERA (2004) however warns that practical diﬃculties of designing and partici-
pating in a slot auction should not be underestimated, especially because of the complex
interdependencies between airport slots. Also, NERA (2004) stresses that the implementa-
tion cost of auctions will be higher than those of the other market mechanisms suggested in
the study. In contrast, posted prices is an easily implementable method that presents the
great advantage of encouraging certainty in airline route planning and continuity of scheduled
services Reynolds-Feighan and Button (1999)3.
In this paper, we study a Cournot-type model of airport slot allocation that mimics the
current slot allocation process but allows posted prices on slots to be introduced: In a ﬁrst
stage, ﬁrms express capacity (slots) requests and capacity is allocated by the coordinator. In a
second stage, ﬁrms compete ”a la Cournot” under their production capacities. We show that,
the introduction of posted prices usually does not succeed in clearing the market: First, for
low posted prices, airlines’ capacity requests appear not to be impacted by the posted price.
Then, above a certain threshold, the global slot requests suddenly and discontinuously drop
to a level that is strictly below the overall capacity. If, rather than posted prices, the regulator
decides to introduce limited ﬁnes on unused slots, we show that excess capacity is actually
reduced for limited ﬁnes and that prices fall. However, if ﬁnes are large enough, it happens
3During the concertation with the Commission that followed the publication of the NERA study NERA
(2004), these reasons were also given by the French regulator to justify its preference for posted prices over
all other proposed mechanisms for the primary allocation of slots, the preferred option for primary allocation
being an improvement of the existing administrative procedure. See for example the ”Outcome of study on
slot allocation procedures”, ECAC report DGCA/124-DP/6, issued in December 2005.
3that they succeed in eliminating excess-capacity at the cost of a reduced produced quantity,
or equivalently at the cost of a higher price (as compared with the ﬁne free situation). We also
show that posted prices may lead to a situation in which an increase in overall airport capacity
results in a drop in produced quantity, which may seem somewhat paradoxal. Finally, we also
present a dynamic model of slot allocation, in which we recover the well-known phenomenon
of ”baby-sitting of slots” and show that making the 80-20 rule more severe to avoid excess-
capacity can sometimes be counterproductive, when it results in lower quantities being put
on the market.
The ﬁrst part of the paper, Section 2, presents the static model of slot allocation and
introduces the technical assumptions used throughout the paper. Section 3 then presents the
equilibrium structure of the game and discusses how it may be used to study the impact of
posted prices when there is competition on the downstream market. In Section 4, we extend
the static model to a two-period game to capture the strategic use of the grandfather rule
as a barrier to expand and show how this may actually beneﬁt consumers in the short run.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A static model of slot allocation
In this section, we describe a general static model of airport slot allocation. In this model, we
assume that capacity (airport slots) is ﬁxed and we denote by K the total available capacity.
The problem is modeled with a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, airlines are allocated
production capacities via an allocation process: Airlines provide the coordinator with their
capacity request. The coordinator then processes the requests and comes out with a capacity
allocation. In the second stage of the game, airlines compete in quantities under their capacity
constraints on the downstream market. In this game, we assume perfect information: All
parameters are common knowledge, as well as the allocation rule (conditional on the airlines
requests).
2.1 The allocation rule
The coordinator sets a procedure to allocate capacity on the basis of demands expressed
by the ﬁrms. This procedure is described through an allocation rule (Kall
1 ,Kall
2 ): if ﬁrm 1
4requires a capacity ϕ1 and ﬁrm 2 a capacity ϕ2, then ﬁrm 1 is granted a capacity Kall
1 (ϕ1,ϕ2),
while ﬁrm 2 gets Kall
2 (ϕ1,ϕ2).
For exposition clarity, we deﬁne the airlines capacity rights as the capacities that are












We assume that the allocation rule Kall (.,.) satisﬁes the following properties:
1. It matches demands if they are compatible with the maximum available capacity:
ϕ1 + ϕ2 ≤ K ⇒ Kall
i (ϕ1,ϕ2) = ϕi, i = 1,2 . (1)
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4. If ﬁrm i claims more than its capacity rights while ﬁrm j claims less than its capacity
rights, then ﬁrm j’s request is satisﬁed, while ﬁrm i gets the remaining capacity. Thus

   

















i (ϕ1,ϕ2) = K − ϕj
Kall
j (ϕ1,ϕ2) = ϕj
(4)
Note that properties (1) to (4) imply that the capacity rights are suﬃcient to deﬁne
uniquely the allocation rule over the set of possible capacity requests (ϕ1,ϕ2). Basically,
they mean that each airline is given rights over a certain amount of capacity and can get
more than this capacity only if its competitor requires less than its own rights.
2.2 Notations and technical assumptions
The market served by the airlines is characterized by the inverse demand P(q). We assume
that capacity and production are costly, with respective costs ci(qi) and ki(Ki) for ﬁrm i.
5Thus, if Ki stands for the capacity allocated to ﬁrm i and qi for the quantity it produces,
ﬁrm i incurs a cost equal to Ci(qi,Ki) = ci (qi) + ki (Ki). We follow Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) on the assumptions on the costs and inverse demand, that is we assume that there
exists some X > 0 such that
• P(q) is strictly positive over (0,X), C2 over (0,X), concave and strictly decreasing.
• ci and ki are C2 over [0,∞), convex and satisfy ci(0) = ki(0) = 0 and c′
i(0),k′
i(0) > 0
(for i ∈ {1,2}).
We also deﬁne best-responses for the unconstrained Cournot game :
r(qj,c) = argmax
qi
qiP(qi + qj) − c(qi) . (5)
For a given airline (say 1), we will refer to r(q2,c1) as the short-run Cournot best response
to quantity q2 and to r(q2,c1+k1) as the long-run Cournot best response. Accordingly, related
Nash equilibria will be referred to as, respectively, the short-run and long-run Cournot equi-












. Under the assumptions
on P, c and k, these equilibria always exist and are unique.
2.3 The ﬁrms problems
Once the coordinator has committed to an allocation rule, the airlines play a two-stage game.
• Stage 1: The two airlines simultaneously express capacity demands ϕ1 and ϕ2.
According to these demands, ﬁrm i receives capacity Kall
i (ϕ1,ϕ2).
• Stage 2: The two airlines compete ` a la Cournot with quantities constrained by their
production capacities (qi ≤ Kall
i (ϕ1,ϕ2) ).
Airline i’s proﬁt is therefore given by
π(qi,qj,Ki) = qiP(qi + qj) − (ci(qi) + ki(Ki)) . (6)
Note that the current airport charging system is likely to correspond to the case of no
capacity cost (ki ≡ 0), as airport slots are allocated freely by coordinators. However, one
could argue that the coordinator, often facing a large excess demand with respect to the
6number of available slots on highly congested airports4 and being granted access to airlines
information, might allocate the capacity to the ones most likely to operate the schedule, e.g.
because they have the ﬂeet it calls for. Hence, part of the capacity cost ki might also relate to
the airlines ﬂeet. Finally, one of the goals of this paper is precisely to study the consequences
of the introduction of positive posted prices on capacity, that is of costly capacity.
2.4 The Second Stage Cournot Subgame
In order to determine the airlines’ claims over capacity, we ﬁrst need to express the proﬁts
they realize in the Cournot competition stage as a function of their production capacities.
This is a standard problem and is treated, among others, by Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997).
The expression of the equilibrium quantities depends on how the capacities compare with the
short-run Cournot best response. Proposition 2 sums up the results, while Figure 1 gives an
illustration.
Proposition 1 The constrained Cournot Nash equilibrium outputs levels (q∗
1,q∗
2) are deter-
mined by the following conditions:
• If (K1,K2) belongs to Region A (i.e. K1 ≤ r(K2,c1) and K2 ≤ r(K1,c2)), both ﬁrms
produce up to capacity, that is (q∗
1,q∗
2) = (K1,K2).
• If (K1,K2) belongs to Region B (i.e. K1 > r(K2,c1) and K2 ≤ KSR
2 ), ﬁrm 2 produces




• If (K1,K2) belongs to Region C (i.e. K1 ≤ KSR
1 and K2 > r(K1,c2)), ﬁrm 1 produces




• If (K1,K2) belongs to Region D (i.e. K1 > KSR
1 and K2 > KSR
2 ), both ﬁrms produce





Proof: See e.g. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997). To see the intuition behind this result,
note that under under our assumptions, each ﬁrms’ proﬁt as a function of the quantity it
4As an example, 251.000 slot requests issued by as many as 43 airlines followed the bankruptcy of Air Lib
at ORY, in which 35.658 slots became available (see NERA (2004)).
7Region D
Region A Region B
Region C
Figure 1: Quantities put on the market for given allocated production capacities.
puts on the market is quasi-concave when it has no capacity-constraint. Hence, when ﬁrm i
is constrained by a production capacity Ki, its constrained best response to a quantity qj put
on the market by its competitor is simply the maximum of its unconstrained best response
r(qj,ci) and its production capacity Ki. These best responses then yield the equilibrium
quantities announced in the proposition.
3 The Nash equilibria of the capacity allocation game
If airlines could get as much capacity as they wanted in the ﬁrst stage, they would choose
capacities equal to the long-run Cournot equilibrium quantities,5 (K1,K2) = (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ),
and would therefore produce up to their capacities in the second stage. The allocation process,
however, allows airlines to prevent, to some extent, their competitor to acquire capacity that
could be used ”against them”. In the extreme case where capacity is free, airlines do not have
any incentive to restrain their requests and would typically end up granted with their capacity
5See, for example, Gabzewicz and Poddar (1997).
8rights. When capacity is costly, the situation is somewhat less simple and the advantages
of limiting one’s competitor capacity have to be balanced with the costs incurred for doing
so. Precisely, whether or not an airline will decide to ask for more capacity than what would
appear optimal in an unconstrained setting will depend on whether K is large enough, and
on how the long-run Cournot proﬁts Π1(KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) and Π2(KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) compare with the
proﬁts airlines would make if granted with their capacity rights. Indeed, if the capacity rights
are asymmetric enough to ensure a proﬁt above the long-run Cournot proﬁt for one of the
airlines, this airline might ﬁnd in its own interest to ”block” the Cournot outcome. To this
end, the airline claims more capacity than what its long-run Cournot quantity would require,
thus reducing its competitor’s production capacity. The formal result is stated in the next
section.
3.1 The equilibrium result
We will need to distinguish two Regions to describe ﬁrm demands (see ﬁgure 2).
• Region 1 is the set of capacities (K1,K2) which are either strictly below the long-run
Cournot best-response curves or such that one of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is strictly superior to
Cournot long-run proﬁt.

   
   








• Region 2 is the set of capacities (K1,K2) which are above at least one of the long-run
Cournot best-response curves and such that both ﬁrm’s proﬁts are inferior to Cournot
long-run proﬁt

   
   








These regions are sketched in ﬁgure 2, Region 1 being the grayed area and Region 2 the
other one (including the frontier).
We also need to introduce a technical assumption.








Figure 2: Regions 1 and 2
constrained Cournot proﬁts of the ﬁrms, Π1(K1,K−K1) and Π2(K−K2,K2), are increasing
in their own capacity on Region 1 ∩ {K1 + K2 = K}.
This assumption formally states that airlines, if they know for sure that any capacity they
do not get will be given to their competitor, never want to release any capacity (in Region 1).
Assumption A1 thus in particular implies that in Region 1 it is marginally better for an
airline with excess capacity rights (that is, an airline with capacity rights such that it would
eventually not ﬁnd interesting to produce up to capacity if it received its capacity rights)
to pay for unused capacity rather than to loose market power by allowing its competitor to
produce more on the ﬁnal market. Though this assumption may seem strong, it is noticeable
that is always satisﬁed in the simple symmetric case where demand is linear and the capacity
and production marginal costs are constant (see Proposition 2). In general, it is suﬃcient for
this assumption to be satisﬁed that the marginal cost of capacity remains small compared to
10the markup at the long-run Cournot equilibrium.6
Proposition 2 When ﬁrms costs are linear and symmetric and demand is linear, the capac-
ity constrained Cournot Game satisfy Assumption A1.
Proof: See in Appendix.
We can now characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the capacity allocation game that
are not Pareto-dominated. The formal result is presented in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Under the technical assumption A1, we have
• If Kall  
K,K
 
belongs to Region 2, capacity demands equal to the long-run Cournot
quantities (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) constitute a Nash equilibrium of the capacity allocation game.
If some other Nash equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated by (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ).
• If Kall  
K,K
 





Nash equilibrium of the capacity allocation game. If some other Nash equilibria exist,




Proof: First, we can note that, if there exists a Nash equilibrium of the capacity allocation
game (ϕ1,ϕ2) such that the available production capacities are not completely allocated (
Kall
1 (ϕ1,ϕ2)+Kall
2 (ϕ1,ϕ2) < K), then the granted capacities must be equal to the requested
ones. Each ﬁrm could therefore obtain less or slightly more production capacity without
modifying its competitors production capacity. It comes then as a consequence of the standard
model (for K = +∞) that (ϕ1,ϕ2) would have to be equal to the long-run Cournot quantities.
Indeed, otherwise at least one ﬁrm would ﬁnd an interest in deviating slightly.
The proof then rely on several lemmas that are presented in appendix and can be decom-
posed in three steps:
• Step 1: From Lemma 1, if there exists a Nash equilibrium (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗
2) of the capacity






2)) belong to Region 1,
































LR) stands for the demand-price elasticity (resp. price) at
the long-run Cournot equilibrium.


















to Region 2. From Step 1, there can not be any Nash equilibrium yielding allocated ca-
pacities in Region 1 (otherwise Kall  
K,K
 
would belong to Region 1). Moreover, from
Lemma 3, the demands (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) constitute a Nash equilibrium. The only remain-
ing potential Nash equilibria require an allocation in Region 2, and are consequently
Pareto-dominated by (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ). This completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.








is a Nash equilibrium, and there is no Nash
equilibrium yielding an allocation (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ). From Step 1, if there is a Nash equi-
librium (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗











. To complete the second part
of the proof, we use Lemma 5: There is no Nash equilibrium (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗
2) such that all the













2)) belongs to Region 2.
This achieves the proof of the proposition.
3.2 Implications
First, we want to analyze how capacity rights impact on the price paid by consumers. When
the overall capacity is small (K ≤ KLR
1 + KLR
2 ), airlines end up granted with their capacity
rights. In this case, the price paid by consumers is P(K) as long as the capacity rights lie
below the short-run Cournot curves but may rise above this level if the slot allocation is too
asymmetric. In this case, the ”most favored” airline will not produce up to capacity. Now
consider overall capacities such that K > KLR
1 + KLR
2 . In this case, the behavior of the
airlines and the ﬁnal quantity and price on the market depend on how balanced the capacity
rights are7. Typically, starting from balanced capacity rights, the possible situations that
may arise are depicted on Figure 3 and described below.
7Note here the use of the term balanced as a loose substitute for symmetric, which would actually be
inappropriate here. Indeed, we do not impose that ﬁrms are symmetric, so that the Cournot quantities, for
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In this ﬁgure, arrows link capacity rights to the produced quantity on the ﬁnal market.
Figure 3: An illustration of the equilibrium outcomes
1. if capacity rights are well balanced, airlines ask for the long-run Cournot capacities,




2. with a limited imbalance, capacity rights belong to Region 1 and Region A. Airlines
therefore request and receive their capacity rights, and thereafter produce up to capac-
ity. In this case, the price on the market, P(K), is lower than if no capacity constraint
was imposed. If the overall capacity is too large, this case may not exist.
3. when the imbalance becomes more signiﬁcant, capacity rights still belong to Region 1
but are not anymore located in Region A. Accordingly, even if both airlines still request
and get their capacity rights, one of them (the ”favored” airline) prefers to produce
less than its allocated capacity. The resulting price on the market is then increasing in
13the imbalance, but may still be lower than the long-term Cournot price. Again, if the
overall capacity is large enough, this case does not exist.
This analysis suggests that the design of the capacity rights may have an impact on
eﬃciency for intermediate values of the available capacity. Noticeably, consumers are better
oﬀ when the capacity rights are slightly less balanced than (capacities equal to) the long-run
Cournot outcome. In this case, the positive eﬀect linked to the ﬁrms not taking into account
the capacity costs, which are sunk during the Cournot competition stage, is more important
than the negative eﬀect linked to the higher market power of the favored ﬁrm.
Note that the asymmetry in capacity rights is exogenous here. For the particular forms
of capacity auction (such as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or a uniform-price share auction) con-
sidered in Eso et al. (2006), it may happen that asymmetry in the capacity allocation arise
endogenously. This happens when the overall capacity is above a capacity threshold that
is strictly lower than the unconstrained Cournot quantity. Accordingly, in Eso et al. (2006)
the social surplus never beneﬁts from the fact that the large ﬁrm prevents its competitors to
access capacity.
3.3 Clearing the market with posted prices?
In the last section we discussed how, in the presence of capacity costs, asymmetric capacity
rights may make consumers better oﬀ than they would be in an unconstrained setting. In this
section we discuss the introduction of posted prices under the current slot allocation process.
Note that posted prices, being deﬁned as a ”rate per slot per season”, may be modeled as
as tax on capacity. The idea behind posted prices is that they would provide incentives for
airlines to use slots eﬃciently, as they would typically make use of slots by ineﬃcient airlines
not proﬁtable and reduce the incentives to make strategic use of excess capacity.
In NERA (2004), it is suggested that a main diﬃculty for the implementation of posted
prices stems from the fact that ”airport operators might have little information about the way
that airlines would be likely to respond to higher prices, at least during the early stages of
adjusting from current charges toward market clearing levels”. Our model predicts that, in the
presence of competition on the airport and an initial imbalance of capacity, airlines responses
are ﬂat for low values of posted prices as long as capacity rights belong to Region 1. Then,
if the posted price reaches a certain level τ∗
k, such that capacity rights belong to the frontier
14between Region 1 and Region 2, airlines requests for capacity encounter a discontinuity,
negative for the ”favored” airline, positive for the other one, and total allocated capacity
decreases. Above this threshold, airlines requests for capacity decrease when posted prices
increase and airlines produce up to capacity. At the regime switch, the global quantity put
on the market ”usually” decreases but may also increase. This mostly depends on the level
of ”excess-capacity” of the favored airline when there is no tax on capacity : if the excess-
capacity is large, the ﬁnal quantity put on the market will increase at τ∗
k, while it will decrease
for limited excess-capacity.
Figure 4 provides an example where the ﬁnal produced quantity is larger when no posted
prices are imposed (in this case the ﬁnal quantity is Kall
1 +qall
2 ) than with posted prices just
large enough to make airlines request capacities equal to the long-term Cournot quantities
















Figure 4: Introduction of posted prices may induce a fall in produced quantities
The intuition behind this result is simple given the equilibrium structure of the game. In
this discussion we denote by τk the posted price. Assume that excess capacity initially (for
τk = 0) exists on the market. Then the capacity rights belong to Region 1. If τk increases,
15Region 1 shrinks but the short-run Cournot best responses remain unchanged. Accordingly,
the capacities requested by the airlines and the produced quantities remain unchanged as long
as the capacity rights remain in Region 1. The regime change occurs when τk is such that
the capacity rights belong to the boundary between Region 1 and Region 2 (this posted price
corresponds to the τ∗
k we have introduced above). For posted prices larger than τ∗
k, airlines
request the long-run Cournot equilibrium quantities and produce up to capacity. Since the
equilibrium quantity accounts for capacity costs when capacity rights belong to Region 2, the
global quantity on the market decreases when τk rises further.
At τ∗
k, the allocated capacity is discontinuous and decreases, while the discontinuity in
the overall produced quantity may be positive or negative. The idea is that if the excess
capacity is large, then the cost incurred by the ”favored” airline for preempting slots rises
steeply when posted prices increase and the regime switch occurs with a limited capacity tax.
The resulting long-run Cournot quantity may not be much lower than the initial long-run
Cournot quantity, which may in turn be signiﬁcantly larger than the initial total quantity.
Conversely, if excess capacity is limited, then a large capacity tax is required to convince the
”favored” airline not to preempt capacity. In this case (see Figure 4), it may happen that
the resulting long-run Cournot quantity, strongly impacted by the capacity tax, is lower than
the quantity produced before the introduction of posted prices.
Now it is worth noting that if by ”market clearing price” one means the price that would
make the airlines capacity requests match the available capacity, such a price usually does not
exist. Indeed, starting from capacity rights such that excess capacity is present for limited
posted prices, the sum of the airlines capacity requests will exceed K until the posted price
reaches τ∗
k. Then quantity requests will drop, with their sum eventually falling lower than
K (the case depicted in Figure 4 fall within this category). We therefore conclude that no
market clearing price exists.
As mentioned above, in the present situation airport slots are allocated freely to airlines.
Moreover the grandfather rule ensures that asymmetry in capacity endowments will persist
over aeronautical seasons as incumbents will face no cost in preventing competitors to enter
their market. In this context, it is commonly admitted that the introduction of posted
prices will result in ”excess” capacity being released, which in turn will foster competition
on the market. Our model shows that this eﬀect is likely to be very limited for low posted
16prices. Introduction of ”conservative” posted prices, as advocated e.g. in DotEcon (2006),
may therefore only have a limited impact on the capacity allocation and the competitivity
of the market. In contrast, introduction of high posted prices may induce a drastic change
of structure on the market, as dominant carriers could eventually be incited to give up their
preemptive power on airport capacity. In theory, we showed that the impact of this regime
switch on welfare can be either positive or negative. In practice, one could expect that
further informations on the considered markets would help draw a conclusion. This is not
clear, however. Indeed, although we emphasized the impact of the consumer welfare (through
the produced quantity) in the discussion on the welfare, cost considerations are important as
well if airlines do not share a common cost structure. In the present context where low cost
airlines develop much faster than major airlines, this speaks in favor of a welfare improvement
at the regime switch. However, incumbents are often former state owned monopolies that did
not aim at maximizing proﬁts and served much larger networks than a private monopolist
would have. Since the grandfather rule makes it possible to prevent entry of competitors at
the cost of using ”unproﬁtable” capacity, this could support the assumption that incumbents
produce enough to induce a decrease in welfare at the regime switch8...
3.4 The impact of the introduction of a tax on unused slots
It is worth noting that the introduction of posted prices, implying a monetary transfer from
airlines to airports, is not painless to airlines. An alternative to posted prices has therefore
been proposed that focuses on the ineﬃcient use of ”owned” slots: a tax on unused slots.
The introduction of such a tax t changes the cost function of airline i from Ci(qi,Ki) =
ci (qi)+ki (Ki) to C∗
i (qi,Ki) = [ci (qi)−tqi]+[ki (Ki)+tKi]. This makes Region 1 shrink (as
illustrated in Figure 5) but in the same time it makes the short-run best responses increase.
Accordingly, if initially an airline is dominant on the airport and does not produce up to
capacity, the introduction of a limited tax on the unused slots will actually make it produce
more than it would have without the tax. However, in some cases the tax may induce a
regime switch and results in airline requesting their long-run Cournot quantities. In this
8At this point of the article, the possibly positive impact of the grandfather rule on the welfare may not
be obvious. It should become much clearer in the section devoted to the dynamic model of slot coordination.










In this ﬁgure, Regions are sketched for diﬀerent values of the tax on unused slots, τu and
τ′
u, with τu < τ′
u. The long-run best responses remain unchanged while the short-run best
responses are lifted. Moreover, the dashed line standing for the isoproﬁt Π2(K1,K2) =
Π2(KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) related to τ′
u is below the plain line standing for the one related to τu, so that
Region 1 shrinks when t increases.
Figure 5: Impact of a tax on unused slots on Region 1
3.5 Capacity expansion under slot allocation
Now assume that an airport is able to increase its runway capacity while posted prices
remain constant. Our equilibrium result implies that capacity expansion may result in a
lower quantity being produced on the market. Indeed, if initially an airline is dominant on
the market, the new airport capacity may push ”capacity rights” away from Region 1. In
this case, the dominating airline will not ﬁnd proﬁtable anymore to prevent its competitor to
9Note that, as the long-run Cournot equilibrium is by construction not impacted by a tax on unused
capacity, this supposes that, initially, capacity costs are strictly positive.
18acquire capacity and allocated capacity will decrease to the long-run Cournot quantity. Just
as in the previous section, the quantity out on the market may then decrease or increase,
since the preemptive behavior of the dominant airline may or may not be advantageous to
consumers.
Note that a similar result (an increase in overall capacity inducing a drop in production)
is also observed in Eso et al. (2006) in the case where capacity is sold through ”eﬃcient”10
auctions and where marginal production costs are strictly convex. The authors ﬁnd that,
if the total available capacity is large enough, ﬁrms eventually buy asymmetric amounts
of capacity, the big ﬁrm then exercising its market power to reduce the quantity put on
the market and increase the price. This creates a discontinuity of the price in the total
available capacity, the price abruptly rising when this capacity exceeds a certain threshold.
The authors then advocate that the regulator should sometimes limit the amount of capacity
to be sold, and show that other types of auctions can perform better in terms of social surplus.
Interestingly, though the similar result is observed in both settings, underlying phenomena
strongly diﬀer. Indeed, in Eso et al. (2006) where the ﬁrms are initially identical and the
capacity provision is endogenous, the produced quantities are symmetric below the capacity
threshold. Instead, in our model where capacity provision is mostly exogenous, airlines need
to be initially asymmetric (through capacity rights) and the outcomes become symmetric
above the capacity threshold.
4 A dynamic model of slot allocation
In this section, our aim is to study the impact of the grandfather rule when slots are allocated
though an administrative process. To this end, we present a dynamic model of slot allocation.
This model is deﬁned as follows: airlines play a ﬁrst game of slot allocation (as described in
the ﬁrst part of this paper). The quantities and capacities chosen in this ﬁrst round allow
to deﬁne the new allocation rule, and a second slot allocation game is played. The timing of
this dynamic game is sketched in Figure 6.
This setting allows to consider the issue of grandfather rights, according to which airport
slots owned by an airline in the last related aeronautical season are automatically renewed
if they have been suﬃciently used, while slots whose utilization rate lies below 80% are put













Figure 6: Timing of the dynamic game.
back to the slot pool. For the sake of simplicity11, the usual grand-father rule described above




i stand for the capacity and quantity of airline i in
the ﬁrst period, then the inherited capacity K
I,2




















where ρ is a parameter (located between 0 and 1) chosen by the regulator (that would be
the analogous of the 80% in the usual grand-father rule setting). As stated, ρ describes to
what extend the over-provision of capacity is punished. If ρ is equal to 0, then the capacity
owned in the ﬁrst period is fully renewed to the airline, and there is no incentive to produce
up to capacity. On the contrary, if ρ is equal to 1, unused slots are fully lost. Note that the
capacity described in equation (9) stands for historical rights as introduced in the ﬁrst part
of the paper.
4.1 Technical assumptions
In the dynamic setting, unused capacity may be released after the ﬁrst round to feed the
slot pool. Because it seems too restrictive to impose that second round’s capacity rights do
not depend on the ﬁrst round, we will assume here that the remaining capacity (say, the slot



















Combining (10) with the grand-father rule (9), we can write the capacity rights in the second
round as a function of the capacities (resp. quantities) obtained (resp. produced) in the ﬁrst
11This rule is smoother than the usual one, as its derivatives are continuous (and even constant). Also,
airlines may manipulate the 80-20 rule to limit the release of under-used slots (see NERA (2004)). We
therefore feel conﬁdent that providing a slightly modiﬁed grandfather rule that exhibits the same qualitative
features as the theoretical one will not much change the picture.







K + ρ(qi − qj) + (1 − ρ)(Ki − Kj)
 
. (11)
To allow for explicit computations, we also make technical assumptions on the form of the
costs and demands. Production and capacity costs are supposed to be linear and equal
among periods, with marginal costs respectively equal to c and ck. We assume further that
the inverse demands P(1) and P(2) are linear and that demand is increasing from round 1 to
round 2. Precisely, we write P(1)(Q) = a(1) − b Q and P(2)(Q) = a(2) − b Q with a(2) > a(1).
Finally, we assume that the traﬃc growth is such that in the second round, irrespective of the
ﬁrst round outcomes, airlines will request the whole capacity and thereafter produce up to
capacity. This strong assumption reﬂects the fact that airlines are conﬁdent in the growth of
air traﬃc demand and that demand in the second round is larger than the airport capacity.
4.2 Actualized proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 in the ﬁrst stage
Under the assumptions introduced in the previous section, the proﬁt of airline i in the second







K + ρ(qi − qj) + (1 − ρ)(Ki − Kj)
 
, (12)
where η is deﬁned as
η = a(2) − c − cK − b K . (13)




























This expression of the actualized proﬁt may be decomposed in the sum of a ”ﬁrst round
like” proﬁt (ﬁrst line of (14)) and additional terms that do not involve airline i’s decision
variables qi and Ki (second line of (14)). The two-stage game is therefore very similar to the
static game studied in the ﬁrst part of the paper, with the exception that the expectation of
future proﬁts impacts on the airlines marginal costs. In particular, the short-run and long-
run production cost decreases respectively from c to c−
η
2ρ and from c+ck to c+ck −
η
2, so
that the expectation of future proﬁts makes airlines want to produce more than they would
21be prone to in the static game. The fact that airlines may request and use slots that are
not immediately proﬁtable, just because they expect them to become so in the near future is
well-known in the airline industry, and often referred to as the ”baby-sitting of slots”. Note
further that the ”actualized” short-run production cost is increasing in ρ. This implies, as
expected, that airlines are prone to produce more when the grandfather rule becomes more
severe. In contrast, the long-run cost is independent of ρ. Thus, we see that a reinforcement
of the grandfather rule is formally identical to the tax on unused slots described in the last
section.
Though the expression for the actualized proﬁt of the airlines involves more terms than the
standard proﬁt, the equilibrium result proved in the static case still holds in the dynamic case.
This observation, together with the analogy between a decrease of ρ and the introduction
of a tax on unused slots, fully characterizes the impact of an increase in the severity of the
grandfather rule: if limited, it will increase production on the market, but if set too high, it
will be counterproductive. These results are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under the technical assumptions introduced in Section 4.1, the dynamic slot
allocation game is equivalent to the static slot allocation game. Moreover, the distortion
induced by the grandfather rule on the ﬁrst round of the game is formally identical to the one
induced by a tax on unused slots.
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this article we studied a model of airport slot allocation that mimics the slot allocation
process currently in use at congested airports in most European Countries but allows capacity
to be costly. Introduction of posted prices for slots is indeed one of the market-based mecha-
nisms suggested by the EU Commission to improve eﬃciency of runway capacity allocations
at congested airports.
In our model, airport capacity is ﬁrst allocated by the coordinator through an adminis-
trative procedure before a constrained Cournot market game takes place. The equilibrium
structure of the game is rather simple, with airlines either claiming their capacity rights
or their long-run Cournot equilibrium quantities. Concretely, this implies that, if initially
a carrier is dominant in the considered airport, competing airlines will not respond to the
22introduction of limited posted prices but may in turn cut production for high posted prices.
Indeed, under the current slot allocation process a dominant carrier would not take capacity
costs into account unless these are large. This has several implications. First, it implies that
the introduction of a limited tax on unused capacity, which would convert production cost
into capacity cost, would typically lead to an increase in the produced quantity. Also, it
implies that asymmetry in airport slot allocations may beneﬁt consumers even in the absence
of network externalities or economies of scale. In this case, an increase in airport capacity
may result in a price increase if it makes expansion deterrence from the dominant carrier
unproﬁtable. Finally, the discontinuity of the airlines strategies supports the common view
that a market clearing level of price for slots may be diﬃcult to establish. It is indeed symp-
tomatic that, in the static model presented in the paper, such a level does not even exists.
In practice, the equilibrium of the game suggests that, if posted prices were to be introduced
gradually, the regulator would initially face essentially unresponsive airlines, so that only
little information could be gained on the (properly deﬁned) market clearing level of price.
Then, if slot prices were set high enough to induce the regime switch, the requested capacity
would fail below the available capacity and call for subsequent adjustments in the posted
prices. Only these could make at last the requested capacity match the airport capacity.
Notice however that this reasoning is based on a straightforward dynamic extension of the
model in which myopic airlines repeatedly engage in a static game. The adjustment process
and the associated behaviors of the airlines are actually beyond the scope of the present paper
and remain to be investigated.
In the ﬁnal part of the paper, a natural two-period extension of the static model is
presented. This models allows to study the impact of the grandfather rule on the behavior of
the airlines. In particular, we observe the well-known phenomenon of ”baby-sitting of slots”,
according to which airlines that expect demand for air transport to rise in the near future may
exploit slots that are not immediately proﬁtable. When demand is assumed to rise steeply
between the two periods, as in the particular case presented in this article, the impact of the
grandfather rule on the consumer welfare is positive. This contrasts with the general belief
according to which baby-sitting is the sign of an ineﬃcient use of runway capacity. We also
show that a reinforcement of the 80-20 rule is formally equivalent to a tax on unused slots.
Accordingly, it is shown to be counterproductive if set too constraining.
23Now they are several directions that could be of interest for future research. It could
indeed be interesting to allow new competitors to enter the market and see how results
presented in this paper are impacted. Also, the study of the aforementioned dynamical
adjustment of the slot level of price could give additional insight on what could be gained if
posted prices were implemented.
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25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We recall that this proposition states that technical assumption A1 is satisﬁed in the sym-
metric case when the demand is linear and the capacity and production marginal costs are
constant.
Proof: In this proof, the inverse demand is given by P(Q) = a−bQ and the cost of ﬁrm
i are given by C(qi,Ki) = cqi + cKKi. Firm i’s proﬁt is therefore given by
π(qi,qj,Ki) = qi(a − c − b(qi + qj)) − cKKi . (15)
We ﬁrst consider the case where (K1,K2) belong to Region A. In this region, ﬁrms choose to
produce quantities equal to their capacities so that as long as K1 + K2 = K, the ﬁnal price
is constant and given by a − bK. Firm i’s proﬁt is therefore given by Ki
 
a − c − ck − bK
 
.
Now remind that (K1,K2) belong to Region 1. Thus, either one of the ﬁrms proﬁts is
strictly greater than its long-run Cournot proﬁt, or K ≤ a−c−cK
3b . In both cases, we get that
a − c − ck − bK is positive, which imply that ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is increasing in Ki.
We now consider the case where (K1,K2) belong to Region 1 but not to Region A12 and
saturate the allocation constraint K1 + K2 = K. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that (K1,K2) belong to Region 1 and to Region B. In this region, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are given
by
Π1(K1,K2) =
































− bK2 − cK
=
a − c − 2cK − 2bK2
2
.
12According to the parameters values, such (K1,K2) may or may not exist.
26We therefore need to show that K2 < a−c−2cK
2b .
Note that in Region B, ﬁrm 2’s capacity is lower that its long-run Cournot capacity KLR
2 =
a−c−cK
3b . For parameter values such that a−c−cK
3b < a−c−2cK
2b , this inequality is suﬃcient to
prove the proposition.
Assume now that a−c−cK
3b ≥ a−c−2cK
2b . Notice that for (K1,K2) in Region 1 and Region B,
ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is strictly greater that its long-run Cournot proﬁt. Since Π1 is decreasing in
K2, we get that K2 as to be lower that the capacity   K2(K1) that solves
Π1(K1,   K(K1)) = Π1(KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) . (16)
An application of the Implicit Function Theorem shows that the function   K2 deﬁned implicitly
in equation (16) is non-increasing. The maximum of the function   K2(K1) for values of K1
corresponding to couples (K1,K2) belonging to Region 1 and to region B is reached when








2b , the couple (K∗
1,K∗
2) does not belong to






9b . This is true if and only if






(a − c − cK)2
9b
⇔









(a − c − cK)2
9b
⇔ (








(a − c − cK)2
9
⇔ (
a − c + 2cK
4
)(
a − c − 2cK
4
) <







< 16(a − c)
2 − 32cK (a − c) + 16(cK)2
⇔ 0 < 7(a − c)
2 − 32cK (a − c) + 52(cK)2.
This is true for whatever values of the parameters. This achieves the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
In this section we state and prove formally the lemmas used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 Assume that both ﬁrms proﬁts satisfy A1. Then if there exists a Nash equilibrium
(ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗




























Proof: Assume that there exists a Nash equilibrium (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗
2) of the capacity game such






2)) belong to Region 1, and such that all






2) = K). Technical assumption















also constitute a Nash
equilibrium and yield the same capacity allocation. Indeed, if ϕ∗
1 is a best response to ϕ∗
2
for ﬁrm 1, then K is also a best response to ϕ∗
2 since it yields the same outcome. Moreover
if ϕ∗
2 is a best response to ϕ∗
1 for ﬁrm 2, then it is also a best response to K (if ϕ∗
2 is a
best response to ϕ∗










by choosing a higher demand than ϕ∗
2 when ﬁrm 1 chooses
demand ϕ∗
1. From the monotonicity of Kall
1 in ϕ1, this is also true when ﬁrm 1 chooses
demand K. Moreover for a given quantity K2 granted to ﬁrm 2, ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt Π2(K1,K2)
is non increasing in K1, whatever the region (K1,K2) belong to. So if ﬁrm 2 has no interest
is choosing a lesser capacity demand than ϕ∗
2 when ﬁrm 1 chooses capacity demand ϕ∗
1, this
is also true when ﬁrm 1 chooses capacity demand K).









is also a Nash
equilibrium and yields the same allocated capacities.
Lemma 2 Assume that both ﬁrms proﬁts satisfy A1. Then the set of capacity pairs (K1,K2)
such that K1 + K2 < KLR
1 + KLR
2 is included in Region 1.
Proof: Assume that ¯ K < KLR
1 +KLR






2 − ¯ K),KLR
2 −1/2(KLR
1 +KLR
2 − ¯ K)). By construction, these capacities
are strictly below the long-run Cournot responses, so that (K0
1,K0
2) belongs to Region 1.




2 ). By construction (K0
1,K0
2) is in the
interior of Region A, so that the function δ  → Π1(K0
1 +δ,K0
2 −δ) is locally strictly increasing.
It is actually strictly increasing as long as the ﬁrms produce up to capacity, that is until
K0
1 +δ becomes large enough to cross the long-run Cournot best response. This happens for
13Because K
all
1 is continuous and Region 1 is an open set.
28K0
1 + δ = r(K0
2 − δ,c1 + k1). Now remind that on ﬁrm 1’s Cournot long run best response
curve, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is given by
Π1(r(K2,c1 + k1),K2)) = max
q P(K2 + q)q − c1(q) − k1(q) . (17)
The Envelop Theorem therefore implies that
∂Π1(r(K2,c1+k1),K2)
∂K2 = P′(K2+r(K2,c1+k1))r(K2,c1+
k1) < 0. As a consequence, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is decreasing in K2 on its long run best response
curve. Since, K0
2 −δ < K0
2 < KLR
2 , this proves that that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt is larger than its long
run Cournot proﬁt when K0
1 + δ crosses ﬁrm 1’s long-run Cournot best response. Technical
assumption A1 then implies that the set {K1 ≥ K0





2 ) technical assumption A1 implies that the
set {K1 ≥ K0
1} ∩ {K1 + K2 = K} belongs to Region 1. By symmetry, we get that the whole
set {K1 + K2 = K < KLR
1 + KLR
2 } belongs to Region 1. This completes the proof of the
lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume that both ﬁrms proﬁts satisfy A1. If allocated capacities for maximum
demands, Kall  
K,K
 
, belong to Region 2, then the demands (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) constitute a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: First note that lemma 2 implies that if Kall  
K,K
 
belongs to Region 2, then













Suppose that ﬁrm 1 chooses a capacity demand KLR
1 .
If ﬁrm 2 demands any capacity ϕ2 between 0 and K − KLR
1 , then the allocated capacities









. Among these capacities demands ϕ2, the long-run Cournot
quantity KLR
2 is the best. This comes from the standard result of the capacity-unconstrained
model ( K = +∞) stating that (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium.
If ﬁrm 2 demands a capacity ϕ2 above K − KLR
























1 , a demand ϕ2 = KLR
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29and saturate the allocation constraint.
















   
belongs to Region








2, we know that whatever ϕ2 above K − KLR
1 leads to an allocation in Region 2, and
to a ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt inferior to the long-run Cournot proﬁt. This proves that a demand
ϕ2 = KLR
2 is a best response to a demand ϕ1 = KLR
1 .
Symmetry completes the proof.
Lemma 4 If allocated capacities for maximum demands, Kall  
K,K
 














• From Lemma 1, we know that for (K1,K2) belonging to Region 1, such that K1+K2 =
K, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is all the higher as Ki is high. So, if ﬁrm 1 expresses a maximum
demand, ﬁrm 2 prefers expressing a maximum demand rather than any other demand
such that the allocation stays in Region 1. The only case where one of the ﬁrms, say
ﬁrm 2, can express a demand yielding an allocation in Region 2 (by reducing ﬁrm 2’s
allocation), is when K ≥ KLR
1 + KLR
2 and Kall  
K,K
 
gives ﬁrm 2 a proﬁt which is
superior to the long-run Cournot proﬁt. But it has no interest for ﬁrm 2 as it would
ﬁnally enjoy a proﬁt inferior to the long-run Cournot proﬁt.




is a Nash equilibrium.
• Moreover there is no Nash equilibrium yielding an allocation (KLR
1 ,KLR
2 ). This is clear
when K < KLR
1 + KLR
2 . Suppose now K ≥ KLR
1 + KLR








, one of the ﬁrms, say ﬁrm 1, has a proﬁt strictly higher than the long-run






2 . Thus, if
14Because whatever K2 above K
LR
2 , and whatever K1, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt Π1(K1,K2) is inferior to Π1(K1,K
LR
2 )





30ﬁrm 2 expresses a demand ϕ2 = KLR
2 , ﬁrm 1’s best reaction will be to choose a demand




This completes the proof.
Lemma 5 If allocated capacities for maximum demands, Kall  
K,K
 
, belong to Region 1,
there is no Nash equilibrium (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗














belongs to Region 2.
Proof: Suppose allocated capacities for maximum demands, Kall  
K,K
 
, belong to Re-
gion 1, and consider any demands (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗














Region 2. As noted in Lemma 3, this would require K ≥ KLR
1 + KLR
2 .
Moreover, as noted in Lemma 4, if Kall  
K,K
 




one of the ﬁrms, say ﬁrm 1, has a proﬁt strictly higher than the long-run Cournot proﬁt, and






2 . So, if ﬁrm 2 expresses a demand ϕ∗
2, ﬁrm 1 would
prefer choosing demand K, which would yield an allocation Kall  
K,K
 
and give it a proﬁt
strictly superior to the long-run Cournot proﬁt (while choosing ϕ∗
1 give it a proﬁt inferior
to the long-run Cournot proﬁt). So (ϕ∗
1,ϕ∗
2) is not a Nash equilibrium, which completes the
proof.
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